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Traumatized samples have relative difficulty in generating specific autobiographical memories on a cue
word task, compared to nonexposed controls. Simultaneously, trauma is associated with highly specific
intrusive trauma memories in day-to-day life. Possibly, day-to-day intrusions and memories generated to
cue words rely on different retrieval processes, with the former dependent on close associations between
retrieval cues and specific memory representations (direct retrieval), and the latter on iterative retrieval
cycles through a hierarchical memory system (generative retrieval). This study investigated this distinc-
tion using two versions of the cue word task, designed to promote generative and direct retrieval,
respectively, in participants with or without a history of child sexual abuse (CSA). The data demonstrated
that CSA participants were less specific than nonabused controls to generative retrieval cues, but this
difference disappeared with direct retrieval cues. This interaction was stronger in CSA participants with
relatively greater posttraumatic stress and remained significant when participants with past or current
major depressive disorder were excluded and also when only those participants with corroborated CSA
were included.
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Numerous studies suggest that individuals with emotional dis-
orders have problems accessing specific aspects of their personal
pasts. For example, Williams and Broadbent (1986) asked de-
pressed suicide attempters and healthy controls to generate specific
autobiographical memories to a series of emotion-related cue
words (i.e., the Autobiographical Memory Test [AMT]). They
found that the parasuicide group was far more likely to produce
overgeneral responses (e.g., to the word party, an overgeneral
response might be “I have never enjoyed parties”) than to reply
with memories of specific experiences (e.g., “I enjoyed Jane’s
party last Saturday”). Such difficulty in producing specific mem-
ories on the AMT has since been demonstrated in various clinical
groups (see Williams et al., 2007, for a review), with the majority
of studies focusing on depressed states (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott,
Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Wessel,
Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach, 2001). Extending this
research into the domain of trauma, Kuyken and Brewin (1995)
showed that depressed women reporting childhood abuse showed
reduced specificity relative to depressed women reporting no
abuse. This relationship between a history of trauma and reduced
memory specificity has since been replicated numerous times and
following various kinds of traumatic events (see Moore & Zoell-
ner, 2007, for a review).
The Affect Regulation Hypothesis
Theoretical conceptualizations of reduced autobiographical
memory specificity have proposed various causal processes (Wil-
liams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007) grounded in mainstream cog-
nitive models of autobiographical recall (e.g., the self-memory
system; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In the context of
trauma, a predominant and compelling view of the reduced spec-
ificity effect has been the affect regulation hypothesis (Williams,
Stiles, & Shapiro, 1999). The proposal here is that trauma-exposed
individuals experiencing trauma-related distress seek to avoid re-
membering the specific details of their traumatic experiences in an
attempt to reduce that distress. This avoidant memory style, it is
proposed, then generalizes beyond the recollection of the trauma
memories until it characterizes much broader domains of autobio-
graphical remembering, resulting in reduced specificity on tests
such as the AMT, which do not explicitly target trauma memories.
The affect regulation hypothesis thus provides a plausible ac-
count of reduced memory specificity on the AMT in distressed
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trauma survivors. However, it fails to account for why those
survivors continue, in many instances, to report frequent intrusive
and very specific memories of their trauma in their daily lives
(Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996; McNally, 2003)
which, at their most disabling, form the core of psychiatric con-
ditions such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). In other words, why are the same
populations that routinely show relatively reduced memory spec-
ificity on the AMT nevertheless characterized by unwanted mem-
ories of specific autobiographical trauma-related material?
One possibility is that day-to-day trauma-related intrusions, on
the one hand, and reduced specificity on the AMT, on the other
hand, are the products of different kinds of memory retrieval
processes (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams et al., 2007). For example, it has
been suggested that the reduced specificity effect on the AMT is a
result of disruption in the effortful “generative” retrieval of mem-
ories within a hierarchically organized memory architecture such
as the self-memory system referred to above (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Williams et al., 2007). Generative retrieval within
this model relies upon top-down memory search processes involv-
ing the use of conceptual representations to form the basis for the
search. Once search criteria are specified, general information
(referring to lifetime periods, e.g., “when I lived in Cambridge” or
to particular classes of events, e.g., “my holidays in France”) at the
top of the hierarchy is rapidly activated. Activation then spreads
through the autobiographical knowledge base from such general
event representations to representations of specific autobiograph-
ical experiences at the bottom of the hierarchy. Within this theo-
retical context, reduced memory specificity results from premature
truncation of the generative search for specific memories, leading
to the retrieval of general autobiographical summaries from higher
up in the hierarchy. In the case of trauma, then, this truncated
search would represent the generic avoidant memory style that is
at the heart of the affect regulation hypothesis.
In contrast, it has been proposed that intrusive recollections of
specific trauma memories in daily life result from a process of
“direct” autobiographical memory retrieval (Brewin, Dalgleish, &
Joseph, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer,
& Tagini, 2004; Williams et al., 2007; see also Burgess & Shallice,
1996). Direct retrieval refers to situations in which an internal or
environmental cue produces immediate activation of a specific
memory, thus bypassing any generative search. It is important to
note that this bypassing of the generative search process ensures
that direct retrieval of memories, including trauma memories, is
unaffected by any premature truncation of generative retrieval
occurring in the service of affect regulation.
In summary, the theoretical proposal is that the affect regulation
hypothesis is operationalized by way of truncated generative au-
tobiographical memory retrieval in distressed trauma survivors
(Williams et al., 2007), leading to difficulty accessing any specific
material by this means. In contrast, retrieval of any specific mem-
ories by way of direct means, including retrieval of trauma mem-
ories, remains unaffected by such truncation of generative search
processes.
The principal aim of the present study was to examine this
putative distinction in the laboratory by contrasting performance
on the standard version of the AMT (proposed to broadly elicit
generatively retrieved responses) with performance on an AMT
constructed to broadly elicit directly retrieved responses. In this
way, we can examine whether the usual reduced memory speci-
ficity effect on the standard AMT in distressed trauma survivors,
relative to controls, is significantly reduced or attenuated on an
AMT designed to promote relatively direct retrieval processes. It is
important to stress that these versions of the AMT do not need to
focus on retrieval of trauma memories because the theoretical
arguments outlined above propose that all generative retrieval will
be relatively compromised and that all direct retrieval will be
relatively spared in distressed trauma survivors.
To construct an AMT designed to promote direct retrieval, we
considered existing theoretical proposals about memories that are
putatively directly retrieved (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996;
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). One potential reason for direct
retrieval is the presence of an extensive repertoire of direct asso-
ciations between cues in the internal and external environment and
specific representations in memory. Such associations could have
become established as a function of the frequency with which
memories have been accessed in response to certain cues and thus
represent the relative automatization of memory access (Moors &
de Houwer, 2006). Another possibility that is not mutually exclu-
sive is that direct retrieval is more likely for memories stored as
image-based mental representations (e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, &
Joseph, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Such memories
would be directly accessed by cues or reminders that either contain
or are strongly associated with image-based information that over-
laps with, or is highly related to, the content of the representations.
These potential processes of automaticity and of facilitated
specific memory retrieval using highly imageable cues were in-
vestigated by Williams, Healy, and Ellis (1999). These authors
showed that manipulating the imageability of the cue words on the
AMT led to marked differences in the proportions of specific
memories recalled, with concrete, highly imageable cues leading
to significantly greater specificity, consistent with the recruitment
of image-based processes during recollection. Furthermore, re-
trieval of specific memories to these highly imageable cues was
relatively immune to the effects of mental load, thus suggesting a
degree of automatization (Williams, Chan, Barnhofer, Eade &
Healy, 2006, Study 3).
On the basis of these theoretical ideas and accompanying data,
we opted in the present study for an AMT methodology with cues
varying in imageability as a vehicle with which to try to opera-
tionalize the putative contrast between relatively direct and gen-
erative autobiographical recall in trauma-exposed individuals out-
lined above. In line with this, the first main hypothesis for the
present study was that a trauma-exposed sample would show
reduced memory specificity relative to controls not exposed to
trauma on the standard version of the AMT, which in general uses
cues of low imageability (Williams & Broadbent, 1986), but that
this group difference would be significantly attenuated or elimi-
nated on an AMT consisting of highly imageable, concrete cue
words designed to promote direct retrieval.
A further key finding in the AMT and trauma literature is that,
among trauma-exposed samples, those individuals with higher
levels of posttraumatic stress or with PTSD show more marked
reductions in specificity on the standard AMT than do those with
less distress or no PTSD (see Moore & Zoellner, 2007). In fact,
there is a well-replicated negative correlation between levels of
intrusion of specific trauma memories in day-to-day life and levels
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of memory specificity on the AMT (e.g., Kuyken & Brewin, 1995;
Wessel, Merckelbach, & Dekkers, 2002).
The prototypical account of these relationships (e.g., Williams et
al., 2007) is that higher distress (including more frequent intru-
sions) following trauma results in a greater emphasis on affect
regulation by way of truncated generative retrieval, and thus re-
duced specificity on the standard AMT. However, ironically, the
intrusions that are a key source of the distress in the first place are
largely unaffected by these regulation attempts by virtue of the fact
that they are habitually directly retrieved and, as we have sought to
argue, direct retrieval is relatively unaffected by truncated gener-
ative search.
Our second hypothesis sought to draw upon these theoretical
claims. We predicted that within our trauma-exposed group, those
survivors with clinically significant levels of posttraumatic stress
(according to established cutoffs on the Impact of Event Scale
[IES]; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) would show a more
marked reduction in memory specificity on the standard AMT in
comparison with those survivors with low levels of symptoms. In
contrast, on the version of the AMT designed to promote direct
retrieval, we predicted that this group difference would be atten-
uated or eliminated, as there is no reason to suppose that levels of
traumatic distress should significantly affect specificity of directly
retrieved general autobiographical material.
To investigate the hypotheses outlined above, we chose to
recruit a sample of adults reporting a history of childhood sexual
abuse (CSA) along with current intrusive symptomatology. This
seemed an appropriate population because adult participants
abused as children were the initial research focus in the trauma and
AMT literature (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995), and the reduced spec-
ificity finding on standard versions of the AMT has proven to be
robust in this population (Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Furthermore,
in theoretical terms it has been argued that childhood represents a
critical period when individuals are highly susceptible to develop-
ing this particular memory style as a form of functional avoidance
(Williams, Stiles, & Shapiro, 1999).
The recruitment of a CSA sample allowed us to address a
supplementary hypothesis emerging out of the current AMT liter-
ature (Williams et al., 2007). Williams et al. noted that a signifi-
cant limitation of the AMT findings with abused individuals to
date (e.g., Kuyken & Brewin, 1995) was that in no instance was
corroboration of the abuse reported. Consequently, our supplemen-
tary hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) was that those among our CSA
participants for whom their history of abuse was corroborated
would show reduced specificity relative to our non-CSA controls
on the standard version of the AMT. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
presume that the interaction effect specified in Hypothesis 1
should also be present across these two groups.
Reduced Memory Specificity and Depression History
To our knowledge, no studies describing reduced autobiograph-
ical memory specificity effects in traumatized samples have con-
trolled for both past and current clinical depression. There are
some studies that have controlled for current major depressive
disorder (MDD; e.g., McNally et al., 2006; Scho¨nfeld & Ehlers,
2006), but in these studies past MDD was not taken into account.
As MDD is a common outcome following trauma (e.g., Shalev et
al., 1998), this is not a trivial problem with the existing data in the
literature, as it means that in all of the studies to date, reporting
reduced specificity associated with trauma, history of MDD and
trauma are confounded. As MDD history has been found to be
associated with reduced memory specificity, even in the absence of
a current MDD diagnosis and even when self-reported depressive
symptoms have been controlled for (e.g., Mackinger, Pachinger,
Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000), this leaves open the possibility
that any apparently trauma-related effects on the AMT are some-
how a function of group differences in MDD history that have not
been adequately assessed (see the Methodological Limitations
section in Williams et al.’s [2007] review of these findings).
In the present study we therefore sought to compare a subsample
of the individuals with CSA who had never been clinically de-
pressed with a subsample of non-CSA controls who had also never
been clinically depressed to resolve this confound. Our fourth
hypothesis was consequently that the never-depressed CSA group
would show reduced memory specificity relative to the never-
depressed non-CSA controls on the standard AMT after also
covarying current levels of self-reported depressed mood. Indeed,
we presumed that the interaction effect specified in Hypothesis 1
should also be present across these never-depressed subgroups. If
this fourth hypothesis is supported by the data, this would indicate
for the first time that trauma is significantly related to reduced
specificity, independent of both current and past MDD.
Method
Participants
CSA participants (n ! 70; 57 women; mean age ! 41.37 years,
SD ! 11.59) were recruited through advertisements in provincial
newspapers inviting participants to come to the laboratory if they
had a history of CSA, of which they reported a continuous memory
(i.e., participants reported that they had always remembered their
CSA experiences). CSA was defined as sexual contact ranging
from sexually related fondling to penetrative acts before the age of
12 (McNally, Clancy, Barrett, & Parker, 2004, 2005). In a standard
semistructured interview (McNally et al., 2004, 2005), participants
reporting CSA were asked a number of questions about the nature
of their abuse (e.g., when it happened, what the duration was, and
who the perpetrator was). All of the CSA participants reported
current intrusive symptomatology.
Control participants (n ! 63; 41 women; mean age ! 39.06
years, SD ! 12.57), group-matched with the CSA participants for
age and education, were recruited through further advertisements
describing research into personality and memory. Participants
were only included in the control group if they denied having a
history of CSA in the semistructured interview (McNally et al.,
2004, 2005).
The Dutch version of the Structured Clinical Interview for the
DSM–IV (SCID; Groenestijn, Akkerhuis, Kupka, Schneider, &
Nolen, 1999) was used to assess MDD in both the CSA and the
control groups. In the CSA group, 10 participants (14.3%) had a
current major depressive episode. Thirty-one participants (44.3%)
reported a history of MDD. Only 1 participant who had had a past
MDD had a current major depressive episode. SCID–PTSD was
also completed for those CSA participants with significant Crite-
rion B symptoms of nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive thoughts
or images. There were 15 CSA participants (21.4%) who had
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current PTSD with these Criterion B symptoms. Six of these
participants were also diagnosed with a current MDD. Further-
more, 3 participants with current PTSD had formerly had an MDD.
Abused participants were asked for corroboration of their abuse,
either by other family members or by documentary evidence (e.g.,
letters, medical records). Thirty participants (42.9%) gave the
name of a person who could corroborate the abuse (e.g., a sibling
who was also abused), and confirmation was forthcoming in all
cases. Two further participants (2.8%) provided a court document
indicating that the perpetrator had been convicted for the abuse. In
the control group, nobody was diagnosed with a current MDD.
There were 8 participants (12.7%) with a previous MDD.
All participants received €50 and reimbursement of traveling
expenses after their participation. This study was approved by the
standing ethical committee of Maastricht University.
Materials
AMT. Two versions of the AMT (Williams & Broadbent,
1986) were used, each containing 10 words, 5 positive and 5
negative (available from Beatrijs J. A. Hauer). A Dutch translation
(Wessel et al., 2001) of the original version of the AMT (the
standard AMT) from Williams and Broadbent (1986) was com-
pared to a version (the concrete AMT) comprising highly image-
able, concrete cue words (e.g., funeral, cuddle). Words for the
concrete AMT were selected on the basis of a pilot study (N ! 13)
in which 25 positive and negative words were rated on 9-point
scales assessing imageability, concreteness, and how readily par-
ticipants felt the words would bring to mind specific memories.
The scales ranged from 1 (not at all visually imageable; extremely
abstract; does not easily elicit a specific memory) to 9 (extremely
visually imageable; extremely concrete; extremely easily elicits
specific memory). Similar ratings were made for the standard AMT
words. On the basis of these ratings, 10 words for the concrete
AMT were selected such that they were significantly more image-
able (M ! 7.85; SD ! .51 vs. M ! 5.06; SD ! .51, respectively),
t(12) ! 7.45, p " .001; more concrete (M ! 7.77; SD ! .55 vs.
M ! 4.60; SD ! 1.20, respectively), t(12) ! 7.60, p " .001; and
elicited specific personal memories more readily than the standard
words (M! 7.55; SD! .88 vs. M! 6.14; SD! .76, respectively),
t(12) ! 6.71, p " .001.1
On each AMT, participants were instructed to recall to each cue
a specific memory about a personally experienced event that
happened at a particular time and place and that lasted less than 1
day. Participants were asked to provide a different memory for
each cue. The cue words were orally and visually presented with
positive and negative words alternating. To familiarize participants
with the procedure, a maximum of 10 neutral practice words (e.g.,
shop, car, trip, conversation) were given until participants recalled
at least three specific memories in direct succession. Participants
were required to respond with a specific memory within 60 s. If
participants gave a nonspecific answer before the 60 s, they were
prompted one time with “Could you be more specific?” Once the
time limit was reached, the experimenter presented the next cue
word. The experimenter transcribed the exact response.
The first responses given to the cue words on the AMT were
coded by an independent rater. Each response was coded as either
a specific memory (i.e., referring to an event at a particular time
and place, lasting less than a day), a general categoric memory
(i.e., a group of similar events that had occurred on repeated
occasions), a general extended memory (i.e., a single event lasting
longer than 1 day), no memory (i.e., a coherent response that was
not a memory; for example, a simple semantic association to the
cue word), or an omission (i.e., no response). The total number of
different specific memories retrieved to the 10 cue words for each
version of the AMT was the primary dependent variable in the
present study. However, for the first hypothesis we carried out a
representative analysis with numbers of general categoric memo-
ries. A second rater scored all of the responses to the standard and
concrete AMTs of a random sample of 20 participants (i.e., 400
memories) to assess interrater reliability. Interrater reliability for
coding a memory as specific or nonspecific was good with a
Kappa of .70.
Beck Depression Inventory—Second edition (BDI–II). The
BDI–II consists of 21 items containing four statements that reflect
depressive symptoms in increasing severity (scored 0–3; range,
0–63; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der Does, 2002). Internal
reliability of the BDI–II in the present sample was excellent,
Cronbach’s # ! .94.
IES. The IES (Brom & Kleber, 1985; Horowitz et al., 1979)
was administered to the CSA group to provide a measure of
frequency of posttraumatic stress symptoms. The IES is a widely
used instrument designed to measure frequency of intrusions and
avoidance of memories related to the participant’s most negative
stressful experience. This could be the CSA or another experience.
Internal reliability of the IES in the present sample was excellent
for the IES total scale, Cronbach’s # ! .93, and also for the
Intrusions and Avoidance subscales, # ! .91 and # ! .88, respec-
tively.
Procedure
Participants first provided written, informed consent. They then
completed the two versions of the AMT in a counterbalanced
order, with a 15-min distractor task (an unrelated questionnaire)
given in between the tests. After the two AMTs, the semistructured
interview and the SCID were administered. Thereafter, partici-
pants filled in the BDI–II, the IES, and some other questionnaires
not reported here. Finally, CSA participants were asked for any
corroboration of their abuse.
Results
Table 1 presents the demographic and the self-report question-
naire data for the CSA and control groups. The groups did not
differ in terms of age or education, although they did differ on
gender ratio. The CSA group scored significantly higher than the
controls on the BDI–II. Fifty-four participants (77%) in the CSA
group filled in the IES with respect to their CSA experience. The
remaining 16 participants cited a range of traumas including death
1 Although the present study is not concerned with valence effects, it is
useful to note that on the basis of similar rating scales, the concrete words
did not significantly differ from the standard words on positive valence
(M! 7.33; SD! .58 vs. M! 7.38; SD! .75, respectively), t(12)" 1, p$
.70, and negative valence (M ! 3.85; SD ! .55 vs. M ! 3.51; SD ! .88,
respectively), t(12)! 1.91, p$ .08, and on emotional intensity (M! 6.31;
SD ! .1.20 vs. M ! 6.11; SD ! .70, respectively), t(12) " 1, p $ .50.
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or illness, accident, and threat to beloved others or to the self. The
IES scores of the CSA group were comparable to those reported in
previous studies of trauma-exposed samples (de Decker, Hermans,
Raes, & Eelen, 2003; Stokes, Dritschel, & Bekerian, 2004). Con-
trol participants filled in the IES with respect to their most negative
stressful event. Thirty-two participants (51%) reported death or
illness to the self or beloved others as their most negative event.
The other control participants cited different traumas, including
accident or threat to beloved others or to the self. Ten control
participants completed the IES but did not report a reference event.
For the whole sample, and for the CSA and control groups con-
sidered separately, the IES (including the subscales) and BDI were
significantly intercorrelated, rs $ .26, ps " .05.
AMT Data
Tables 2 and 3 present the AMT data across the different CSA
and control groups. Again, the various subsamples drawn from the
CSA and control groups did not significantly differ regarding age
and educational level. As for gender, the only subsamples that
significantly differed in gender ratio were the CSA subsample,
who filled in the IES with respect to their abuse and the control
group, as well as the never-depressed CSA and never-depressed
control groups. Yet, initial analyses including gender rendered no
significant main effects or interactions involving this factor, all
Fs " 1. The same was true for initial analyses conducted with
order of AMT presentation (standard– concrete vs. concrete–
standard) as a factor. Therefore, all further analyses are reported
without order and gender as factors.
Psychometric equivalence of the two AMT tasks. A concern
when examining differential degrees of group differences across
tasks is that any significant interactions may simply reflect differ-
ences in the discriminating power of the tasks at hand (e.g.,
Chapman & Chapman, 1973, 1978). We therefore calculated the
true variance of the two versions of the AMT as an index of
Table 1
Demographic and Self-Report Data for Childhood Sexual Abuse (CSA) and Control Groups
Variable
CSA group
(n ! 70)
Control group
(n ! 63)
Test statisticb pM SD M SD
Demographic variables
Mean age 41.37 11.59 39.06 12.57 t(131) ! 1.10 .27
% women 81.4 65.1 %2(1) ! 4.57 .03
Educationa %2(6) ! 4.61 .60
Self-reported symptoms
BDI-II 12.51 12.37 4.46 5.07 t(130) ! 4.81 ".001
IES total 26.86 20.51 13.95 14.02 t(125) ! 4.04 ".001
IES 13.75 10.66 7.88 7.79 t(125) ! 3.49 .001
Intrusions
IES 13.10 11.34 6.02 7.23 t(125) ! 4.08 ".001
Avoidance
Note. BDI-II ! Beck Depression Inventory—Second Edition (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der Does,
2002); IES ! Impact of Event Scale (Brom & Kleber, 1985; Horowitz et al., 1979).
a Scores ranged from 1 ! elementary school to 7 ! academic degree.
b One participant in the CSA group did not fill in the BDI-II and the IES. In the control group, 5 participants did
not fill in the IES. For this reason, the degrees of freedom are lower in the analyses in which these measures are
used.
Table 2
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) Data Across Childhood
Sexual Abuse (CSA) and Control Groups
Type of memory
CSA group (n ! 70) Control group (n ! 63)
Standard AMT Concrete AMT Standard AMT Concrete AMT
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Specific 4.84 2.77 7.03 2.01 6.24 2.28 7.41 2.04
Specific same eventa .17 .45 .06 .29 .05 .21 .02 .13
General categoric 1.23 1.11 .59 .91 .40 .81 .31 .60
General extended 1.33 1.50 .61 .79 .71 .76 .80 .87
No memory 1.80 1.87 1.34 1.54 1.73 1.66 1.36 1.77
Omission .63 1.05 .37 .85 .78 1.12 .11 .31
a Specific same event ! when a particular specific memory was generated two or more times to different cue
words.
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discriminating power (Chapman & Chapman, 1973). True vari-
ance can be estimated by calculating the product of the internal
reliability and the observed variance for each measure from a
sample of healthy control participants. Using this method, the
discriminating powers of the standard AMT and the concrete
AMT, on the basis of the scores of the controls (n ! 63) in the
present study, were 3.32 and 2.65, respectively. It is interesting to
note that the internal reliabilities for both versions of the AMT
were virtually indistinguishable, Cronbach’s #s ! .64. For this
reason we could statistically compare the two measures of true
variance by simply comparing the observed variance using an F
ratio test. On this basis, the two measures did not significantly
differ from each other, p ! .37. Thus, we were able to conclude
that there was no support for the two AMTs being different from
each other in terms of estimated discriminating power (e.g., Chap-
man & Chapman, 1973, 1978), thus giving us confidence that any
significant interaction effects represented differential group differ-
ences that were unlikely simply to be psychometric epiphenomena.
Hypothesis 1: CSA versus control groups. Table 2 presents the
AMT data across the CSA and control groups. A 2 (group: CSA
vs. control) & 2 (AMT: standard vs. concrete) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with numbers of specific memories as the dependent
variable was performed to investigate our first hypothesis that the
CSA group would show reduced memory specificity on the stan-
dard AMT in comparison with controls, but that this group differ-
ence would be significantly attenuated or eliminated on the con-
crete AMT. There were significant main effects of AMT, F(1,
131)! 85.20, p" .001, '2 ! .35, and of group, F(1, 131)! 6.25,
p ! .01, '2! .04. These were qualified by a significant Group &
AMT interaction, F(1, 131) ! 7.71, p ! .006, '2 ! .06. Indepen-
dent samples t tests demonstrated that the groups differed signif-
icantly on the standard AMT, t(131)! 3.15, p! .002, d! .55, but
not on the concrete AMT, t(131)! 1.09, p$ .20, in support of our
hypothesis. The CSA group scored significantly higher on the
BDI–II than the controls, and there were significant negative
correlations between memory specificity and BDI–II scores across
the whole sample, standard AMT, r(132) ! (.31, p " .05;
concrete AMT, r(132) ! (.26, p ! .003. Therefore, the above
analysis was repeated with the BDI–II as a covariate, producing a
pattern of results identical to that reported above.2
As noted in the Materials section, for this main analysis, we
cross-checked the pattern of findings using numbers of categoric
memories as the dependent variable. A 2 (group: CSA vs. con-
trol) & 2 (AMT: standard vs. concrete) ANOVA generated the
same pattern of results as that found with specific memories as the
dependent measure, with significant main effects of AMT, F(1,
131) !15.83, p " .001, '2 ! .11, and group, F(1, 131) ! 16.34,
p " .001, '2 ! .06, qualified by a significant Group & AMT
interaction, F(1, 131) ! 8.71, p ! .004, '2 ! .11. Independent
samples t tests demonstrated that the groups differed significantly
on the standard AMT, t(131) ! 4.57, p " .001, d ! .85, but not
on the concrete AMT, t(131)! 1.69, p! .09. Again, including the
BDI–II in the analyses did not change the results. For the remain-
der of the analyses, we report only those findings involving num-
2 Some authors have argued that an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
is often misused when dealing with covariates that may be related to the
group factor when group membership is not random (see Miller & Chap-
man, 2001). This is potentially relevant in the present study because it is
plausible that CSA participants are more depressed than control partici-
pants for reasons that are directly associated with their history of abuse. In
other words, membership in the CSA group might not be independent of
being somewhat depressed. This means that covarying depressive symp-
toms from the group variable in the present analysis would only allow us
to draw conclusions about whatever is residual about membership in a CSA
group, once the variance associated with depressed mood has been ac-
counted for. However, as Miller and Chapman (2001) also argue, if one is
less concerned about what the residual group variable might actually
represent in an ANCOVA and is simply motivated to discover whether this
residual variable still produces significant effects of interest following
covariation, then an ANCOVA is justified. These were the circumstances
of the present analyses, in which we simply wanted to reassure ourselves
that the significance of the effects associated with the group variable was
not entirely carried by group differences in depressed mood.
Table 3
Specific and General Categoric Autobiographical Memory Data on the Standard and Concrete
Autobiographical Memory Tests (AMT: Williams & Broadbent, 1986) in Subsamples of the Child
Sexual Abuse (CSA) and Control Groups
Subsample
Standard AMT Concrete AMT
Specific Categoric Specific Categoric
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Control-ND (n ! 55) 6.33 2.25 .40 .81 7.40 2.10 .31 .60
CSA filled in IES with respect to abuse (n ! 54) 4.57 2.78 1.24 1.08 7.04 1.99 .52 .86
CSA-IES high (n ! 23) 3.65 2.17 1.43 .90 6.52 2.15 .43 .66
CSA-IES low (n ! 26) 5.42 2.90 1.04 1.11 7.27 1.97 .65 1.09
Control-IES low (n ! 38) 6.63 2.48 .50 .89 7.23 2.21 .32 .70
CSA-ND (n ! 28) 4.78 2.79 1.14 1.18 7.32 1.83 .71 1.15
CSA-C (n ! 32) 4.50 2.64 1.38 1.18 7.22 1.75 .69 1.06
Note. Control-ND ! subsample of never-depressed control participants; IES ! Impact of Event Scale (Brom
& Kleber, 1985; Horowitz et al., 1979); CSA-IES high ! subsample of CSA participants with IES scores of
$35; CSA-IES low ! subsample of CSA participants with IES scores of "19; Control-IES low ! subsample
of control participants with IES scores of "19; CSA-ND ! subsample of never-depressed CSA participants;
CSA-C ! subsample of CSA participants who had corroboration for their abuse.
449AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY
bers of specific memories as the dependent variable. However, the
patterns of findings were comparable to those findings involving
numbers of specific memories when categoric memories were
used.
As a minority of the CSA group (n ! 16) did not identify abuse
as their index trauma on the IES, the above analyses were repeated
with these participants excluded. Mean specificity and categoric
data for the remaining CSA participants (n ! 54) are presented in
Table 3. The results of these analyses with and without the BDI–II
as a covariate yielded the same patterns of significant results as
those previously reported.
Hypothesis 2: CSA participants with and without significant
PTSD symptomatology (vs. controls). To investigate our second
hypothesis, we divided our CSA group on the basis of their IES
scores into those falling within Horowitz et al.’s (1979) nonclinical
range (using the cutoff of "19; CSA-IES low; n ! 26), and those
falling within the likely PTSD range (CSA-IES high; n ! 23)
identified in more recent studies (using the cutoff of 35; Neal et al.,
1994; Wohlfarth, van den Brink, Winkel, & ter Smitten, 2003).
These CSA-IES high and CSA-IES low groups did not differ
significantly in age, t(47) " 1; education, %2(6) ! 3.50, p $ .60;
or gender ratio, %2(1) ! .05, p $ .50.
We compared the performance of these CSA groups with that of
control participants with IES scores "19 (controls-IES low; n !
38) on the two AMT tasks (see Table 3), with a 3 (group: CSA-IES
high vs. CSA-IES low vs. controls-IES low) & 2 (AMT: standard
vs. concrete) ANOVA with numbers of specific memories as the
dependent measure. The results revealed significant effects of
group, F(2, 84) ! 5.80, p ! .004, '2 ! .12, and AMT, F(1, 84) !
65.18, p " .001, '2 ! .44, and a significant Group & AMT
interaction, F(2, 84) ! 9.49, p " .001, '2 ! .18.
To deconstruct the interaction term, we examined the relevant
patterns of paired comparisons using independent samples t tests.
On the standard AMT, the CSA-IES high group was significantly
less specific than the CSA-IES low group, t(45.78) ! 2.44, p "
.02, d ! .72, but the two groups did not differ on the concrete
AMT, t " 1, thus replicating the pattern of findings involving the
whole CSA group versus controls reported above. Unsurprisingly,
the CSA-IES high group also differed from the control-IES low
group on the standard AMT, t(59)! 4.97, p" .001, d! 1.32, and
again the groups did not differ on the concrete AMT, t " 1, thus
reproducing the same pattern. Finally, the difference between the
CSA-IES low and the control-IES low groups was approaching
significance on the standard AMT, t(62) ! 1.88, p ! .07, but not
on the concrete AMT, t " 1, reflecting a significant AMT &
Group interaction between these two low IES groups, F(1, 62) !
5.88, p " .02, '2 ! .04.3
As for the whole study sample, within the CSA group, memory
specificity was significantly negatively correlated with self-
reported depression on the BDI–II, standard AMT, r(69) ! (.25,
p ! .04; concrete AMT, r(69) ! (.38, p ! .001. Consequently,
the above analyses were repeated with BDI–II scores as a covari-
ate, producing an identical pattern of results.
We also examined the correlations between IES scores and
numbers of specific memories, this time within the CSA group as
a whole. Spearman’s correlations were used as the IES scores were
not normally distributed. For the standard AMT, the number of
specific memories was significantly negatively correlated with IES
Avoidance scores, r(67) ! (.26, p " .04, but not with IES
Intrusion scores, r(68) ! (.14, p ! .25, although the latter were
in the anticipated direction. The significant correlations involving
IES Avoidance scores were no longer significant once BDI scores
were covaried, pr(65) ! (.15, ns. For the concrete AMT, IES
scores did not significantly correlate with specificity: for the
IES-Avoidance subscale, r(67) ! (.16, p ! .19; for the IES
Intrusion subscale, r(69) ! (.07, p ! .57. These data broadly
reflect the initial analyses using the IES cutoffs reported above.4
Hypothesis 3: Corroborated CSA group versus control group.
Table 3 also presents the AMT data for CSA participants with
corroboration for their abuse (CSA-C; n ! 32). A 2 (group:
CSA-C vs. controls) & 2 (AMT: standard vs. concrete) ANOVA
with specific memories as the dependent variable revealed signif-
icant main effects of AMT, F(1, 93) ! 93.00, p " .001, '2 ! .38,
and of group, F(1, 93) ! 5.39, p ! .02, '2 ! .11. These were
qualified by a significant Group & AMT interaction, F(1, 93) !
11.27, p ! .001, '2 ! .05. Subsequent independent samples t tests
demonstrated that the CSA-C group was less specific on the
standard AMT than controls, t(93) ! 3.33, p ! .001, d ! .70, but
not on the concrete AMT, t(93) " 1, p $ .60, supporting our
hypothesis. Again, the analyses yielded the same pattern of results
with the BDI–II score covaried.
Hypothesis 4: Never-depressed CSA participants versus never-
depressed controls. Table 3 shows the AMT data for never-
depressed CSA participants (CSA-ND; n ! 28) and for never-
depressed controls (controls-ND; n ! 55). To investigate our
fourth hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (group: CSA-ND vs. control-
ND) & 2 (AMT: standard vs. concrete) ANOVA with number of
specific memories as the dependent measure. There was a main
effect of AMT, F(1, 81)! 56.12, p" .001, '2! .35, and the main
effect of group was approaching significance, F(1, 81)! 3.08, p!
.08, '2 ! .03. The key AMT & Group interaction was also
significant, F(1, 81) ! 9.23, p ! .003, '2 ! .10. Independent
samples t tests again revealed that the CSA-ND individuals were
less specific than the control-ND group on the standard AMT,
t(81) ! 2.71, p ! .008, d ! .61, but not on the concrete AMT,
t(81) " 1, p $ .80. These results therefore support our third
hypothesis. As before, the relevant analyses remained significant
with BDI–II scores included as a covariate.
Discussion
The first hypothesis of the present study was that participants
reporting CSA would exhibit significantly reduced memory spec-
3 It is interesting to note that, as can be seen in Table 3, this was a
crossover interaction. This provides further evidence that the differential
performance across the two tasks is not simply a function of their psycho-
metric properties (Chapman & Chapman, 1973).
4 As a final examination of the relationship between IES scores, BDI–II
scores, and specific memories, we carried out regression analyses to
examine the unique contributions of the scores on the two self-report
measures (as predictors) to the memory scores (as dependent variables).
For the standard AMT, the overall model was significant, F(2, 129)! 7.77,
p " .001, accounting for 11% of the variance in memory scores, and the
standardized betas and part correlations were as follows: for the IES, ) !
(.12, rpart ! (.09, t(127) ! 1.11, ns; for the BDI–II, ) ! (.24, rpart !
(.18, t(127) ! 2.11, p " .05. For the concrete AMT, the overall model
was not significant, F(2, 129)! 2.34, ns, and accounted for only 4% of the
variance in memory scores.
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ificity in comparison with controls not reporting CSA on the
standard version of the AMT, chosen to elicit relatively generative
memory retrieval, but that this difference would be significantly
attenuated or absent on a concrete-word version of the AMT,
designed to promote relatively direct retrieval of memories (Con-
way & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams et al., 2007). The data
supported this hypothesis, even after covarying levels of depressed
mood on the BDI–II and even when analyses were restricted to
those individuals reporting corroboration of their abuse. To our
knowledge, this is the first demonstration that the reliable reduced
memory specificity effect can be eliminated in a trauma-exposed
population, relative to controls, by manipulating the content of the
cue words on the AMT.
The second hypothesis was that a similar pattern would emerge
when comparing those survivors in the CSA group with clinically
significant levels of posttraumatic stress (as measured on the IES)
with those survivors with minimal symptoms. Again the data
supported our hypothesis, even when self-reported depression on
the BDI–II was covaried. This pattern was also mirrored in cor-
relational analyses using the IES Avoidance subscale in the CSA
group. These data are in accordance with the findings from a study
by Scho¨nfeld and Ehlers (2006), published after we began the
present research. Scho¨nfeld and Ehlers compared groups of par-
ticipants with and without PTSD on the numbers of general mem-
ories they retrieved on a standard cue word AMT and on a version
in which the cues were affective pictures. They found that the
participants with PTSD were significantly less general in response
to the pictures than to the words, with no significant difference for
the participants without PTSD. However, in contrast to the pattern
in the present study, Scho¨nfeld and Ehlers found that their PTSD
group remained more overgeneral than did the controls without
PTSD, even on the picture AMT (S. Scho¨nfeld, personal commu-
nication, December 1, 2006).5 Possibly, picture cues match less
well with individuals’ memories than words cues because they are
too specific and therefore still elicit generative retrieval.
The findings pertaining to the above hypotheses are potentially
important in two ways. First, the fact that the same trauma-exposed
participants were either less specific relative to controls or were
not significantly different from controls, dependent on the cueing
context (with comparable findings for high- vs. low-symptom
trauma-exposed groups), is consistent with theoretical conceptual-
izations of autobiographical recollection in distressed trauma sur-
vivors (Williams et al., 2007) that propose relatively distinct
retrieval processes that operate under different circumstances. One
possible implication of the present data is that processes that
disrupt relatively generative retrieval of memories, such as affect
regulation (Williams, Stiles, & Shapiro, 1999), have little or no
effect on relatively direct recall of the personal past. If, as we
assume, intrusive reexperiencing of the trauma in trauma survivors
is a route for relatively direct retrieved memories and such re-
trieval is promoted by using the concrete word version of the
AMT, this argument would suggest that processes of affect regu-
lation targeted to avoid distressing, specific autobiographical ma-
terial are in fact missing the primary source of such distress in the
form of these intrusive trauma memories.
Evidence in support of this possibility is provided by Golden,
Dalgleish, and Mackintosh (2007), who showed that individuals
who had experienced a traumatic bereavement and were suffering
from complicated grief (CG) did not show the usual reduced
specificity effect, relative to bereaved controls not suffering from
CG, on a cue word task (the Biographical Memory Task; BMT)
designed to probe memories from the lifetime of the deceased
loved one (rather than the self). In contrast, they did show the usual
reduced specificity effect on the standard AMT and on a BMT
with reference to the life of a loved one who was still alive. As
memories of the deceased form the content of day-to-day distress-
ing intrusions in CG sufferers, these data provide evidence sup-
porting the view that retrieval of such memories is relatively
immune to putative processes of affect regulation that operate on
the standard AMT.
The present data and those of Golden et al. (2007) do not
necessarily mean that affect regulation in the form of reduced
memory specificity is wholly dysfunctional for traumatized indi-
viduals (in particular for those with significant symptoms), simply
that it is imperfect. For example, it may be that such “avoidance”
processes still mitigate the trauma-related distress experienced by
survivors by sufficiently reducing access to trauma-related mate-
rial by way of relatively generative routes and/or by reducing the
retrieval frequency of other emotive memories. This is a matter for
future research. However, it is important to note that even if these
putative affect regulation processes do effectively compromise
relatively generative recall of the trauma, this in itself may be
dysfunctional over a medium- to long-term period. For example,
there is a growing body of research indicating that successful and
repeated generative recall of traumatic events as a function of
prolonged exposure techniques is broadly beneficial in terms of the
amelioration of posttraumatic stress (e.g., Ehlers, Clark, Hack-
mann, McManus, & Fennell, 2005; Pennebaker, 1995). Further-
more, reduced autobiographical specificity is related to poor prob-
lem solving strategies (e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996,
1997).
The finding that a significant reduced specificity effect on the
standard AMT can be eliminated by selecting different cue words
(and attenuated by using pictures; Scho¨nfeld & Ehlers, 2006) also
has a potentially important methodological implication. This find-
ing highlights the fact that care needs to be taken in selection of
cue materials for future AMT experiments to ensure that the
appropriate memory retrieval context is invoked (see also Wil-
liams et al., 2006; Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999).
Our third hypothesis was that the difference in specificity on the
standard AMT between CSA participants and controls would
remain significant when we included only those participants from
the CSA sample with corroborated abuse. The data supported this
hypothesis and, to our knowledge, this represents the first demon-
stration of the standard AMT effect involving a corroborated abuse
sample.
The final hypothesis of the present study was that the subsample
of our CSA group with no current or past MDD would be less
specific on the standard AMT than would the never-depressed,
non-CSA controls, even after covarying current levels of depressed
mood on the BDI–II. The data confirmed this hypothesis, and
indeed the pattern of findings in support of Hypothesis 1 was also
5 It is important to note there was also no significant Group & Task
interaction for numbers of specific memories in the Scho¨nfeld and Ehlers
(2006) data set and that the significance of the interaction involving general
memories did not survive controlling for verbal IQ.
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replicated across these subsamples. This gives us more confidence
when interpreting the reduced memory specificity effect as it
relates to trauma independent of MDD, in the service of making
theoretical arguments within this literature.
It is important to note that we are not trying to argue that
reduced specificity effects in traumatized populations (such as the
current CSA group) are not influenced by depressed mood or other
symptoms of depression. Indeed, in the present data, self-reported
depressive symptoms on the BDI–II were negatively correlated
with memory specificity, both across the sample as a whole and
within the CSA group, on both concrete and standard versions of
the task. This is perhaps not surprising given the high degree of
intercorrelation between traumatic stress and depressive symp-
toms. Rather, what we have sought to do in the current analyses is
demonstrate that there remains a significant relationship between
AMT performance and trauma once the influence of depression is
controlled for, both by selecting participants with no history of
MDD and by covarying self-reported depressive symptoms on the
BDI–II.
The present study is not without some limitations. The most
significant one is that we included no independent way of assess-
ing that the words in our concrete AMT invoked direct retrieval, as
far as one can actually validate such theoretical constructs (see the
introduction). It may therefore be the case that for some partici-
pants and/or for some cue words in the concrete AMT condition,
the resulting retrieval processes were not direct (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). However, to the extent that this was the
case, it would have gone against the grain of our principal hypoth-
esis (leading to reductions in memory specificity in the CSA group
for these words on the concrete AMT). Consequently, this issue is
perhaps less of a concern for the present study.
The fact that we did not assess direct versus generative retrieval
explicitly in the present study of course means that we have no
data that verify that the key difference between the two AMT tasks
maps closely onto this theoretical distinction. It would be highly
desirable for future studies to explicitly assess the extent to which
retrieval to highly imageable word cues reflected proposed theo-
retical components of direct retrieval such as automaticity or
access through image-based representations. Such studies could
use manipulations of mental load, assess the sensory properties of
the retrieved memories, or examine the time course of retrieval to
different cues. Indeed, once the notions of direct versus generative
retrieval can be deconstructed in terms of such other variables, it
may be that the broader notions themselves prove redundant. This
is a matter for further study.
A further limitation of the current study is that we did not carry
out a complete assessment of trauma history in our control group,
as our primary concern was to establish absence of self-reported
CSA. It may be that some of the controls had experienced signif-
icant traumas that were not CSA with associated effects on their
AMT performances. Again, however, this would have gone against
the grain of our main hypothesis of a group difference on the
standard AMT, relative to the concrete AMT, and so is of less
concern for the present study.
A final limitation is the absence of reliability data for the SCID.
Furthermore, the full set of PTSD questions for the SCID was only
administered to those participants endorsing intrusion-related Cri-
terion B symptoms. This therefore precluded formal comparisons
between CSA participants with and CSA participants without
PTSD. However, we were able to perform analogous comparisons
with high- versus low-PTSD symptom groups using established
cutoffs on the IES, and the results were in line with the study
hypotheses.
In conclusion, the present study showed that the widely repli-
cated finding of significantly reduced autobiographical memory
specificity in trauma-exposed individuals, relative to controls, can
be eliminated by the use of cue words designed to promote
relatively direct autobiographical memory retrieval, with a similar
pattern in high- versus low-symptom-level trauma survivors. The
study also provided the first evidence that we know of that the
reduced memory specificity effect associated with CSA is present
independently of current and past MDD, and after controlling for
current depressed mood.
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